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Summary: In these remarks to an audience of union-side labour lawyers, I caution against
excessive optimism concerning the potential of rights-based constitutional litigation to improve
the lot of workers. Despite recent pro-labour Charter decisions of the Supreme Court of
Canada, litigation will not fundamentally alter the underlying conditions which have
disempowered workers and unions. This is not to say that the constitution is irrelevant, but
rather that its most significant features are economic and political, rather than juridical.

I

INTRODUCTION

I’m here to talk to an audience of labour advocates who are out there doing god’s
work: defending the working class against the rampaging forces of hegemonic
capitalism; pushing back against a couple of centuries of overt judicial hostility and a
couple of decades of legislative indifference; trying to protect the rights, jobs and dignity
of individuals who basically have no other recourse. So I’m here to talk to people
whom I genuinely respect and admire. And I’m here at what might seem like one of the
few hopeful moments that labour lawyers have experienced for many years — a
moment when the Supreme Court finally seems to “get it”, finally seems prepared to
treat workers’ rights as universal, fundamental and inalienable, finally seems willing to
overturn legislation and rewrite the common law in order to vindicate those rights.
Woodsworth said it best: “what bliss it is in this dawn to be alive!”

If I had any sense, any compassion, any modicum of good manners, I would just smile
benignly, say “amen”, present my expense account, and depart.
indeed a blissful dawn, I would do just that.

And if this were

But it isn’t, any more than Woodsworth’s
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dawn was.

His “dawn” was the French Revolution which — having produced the

forerunner of our Charter — soon descended into terror and turned towards
dictatorship. I’m not predicting that the revolution in labour rights launched by the
Supreme Court is heading in quite the same direction. However, my message today —
a message you won’t want to hear — is that at best our dawn is a false dawn and that at
worst our revolution in labour rights may end up, like so many others, devouring its
own.

II

LABOUR RIGHTS AS FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

Let me say up front that the notion that labour rights are fundamental rights, deserving
of Charter protection, is on its face an attractive proposition. After all, workers are
neither commodities nor factors of production; they are citizens. Surely if the Charter
is used to protect citizens against oppression and to ensure their freedom and equality
in the larger society it should also apply in the workplace, a site of serious oppression,
little freedom and endemic inequality.

Moreover, from the labour’s point of view, this new characterization of labour rights has
some strategic attractions. The labour movement is in serious trouble. Workers no
longer identify themselves as producers but as consumers; labour has therefore lost its
raison d’etre as a class-based economic and political movement. Moreover, changes
in labour markets and modes of production have also robbed the labour movement of
much of its former economic power, while globalization has made its national focus
increasingly anachronistic.

As a

consequence of these and other developments,

workers in most advanced democracies confront greater individual insecurity and loss
of collective agency than they have in decades. Arguably, embedding labour rights in
the Charter enables the labour movement to rebuild its alliance with other rightsseeking groups. Engaging with constitutional rights discourse might conceivably
renew its intellectual energy and refresh its message. And finally, if labour could
secure solid protections for workers comparable to those that other citizens’ movements
have won under the Charter, if workers’ rights — to organize, to bargain, to strike, to
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receive a living wage, to enjoy decent working conditions, to have a voice in workplace
decisions, to be treated with respect — if all of these rights were reconceived as
Charter rights, they too could be constitutionalized; and they too would be robustly
protected. That at least is the hope.
II

THE RIGHTS-BASED
CONSTITUTIONALISM

LITIGATION-DRIVEN

JURIDICAL

MODEL

OF

But what does it mean to “constitutionalize” labour rights? As I’ll explain in a minute,
there are several possible ways to think about “constitutionalization”. However, for most
Canadian labour lawyers, constitutionalization means first, that labour rights should be
written into the constitution by amendment or judicial interpretation; second, that no
statute or legal doctrine should be allowed to derogate from them; and third, that they
should be justiciable, that workers denied their rights should be able to secure legal
redress.

The results of constitutionalization would be transformative — so many

believe; the costs would be minimal; and the world would clearly be a better place.

This rights-based litigation-driven model of constitutionalization beguiles not only CALL
members but friends of the labour movement, progressive thinkers and legal scholars
who believe in the transformative potential of law.

They all hope

that litigating

constitutional rights will somehow succeed in balancing capitalism’s equation of
unequal power, ensure social justice and put material flesh on the dry, legal bones of
the liberal-democratic state. But now I have to admit, if you haven’t already guessed:
I am definitely not beguiled. I am an advocate of labour rights; a progressive; and (on a
good day) a scholar: but I do not believe in the rights-based, litigation-driven model of
constitutionalism.

That model of constitutionalism is found in its purest form in the United States, whose
fundamental law guarantees freedom of

association, assembly,

expression and

procedural due process. These guarantees might have been interpreted as protecting
the right of workers to join unions, strike and picket, and be dismissed only on notice
and for cause.

But the courts held otherwise and labour’s rights were not
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constitutionalized. Perhaps this explains why union membership in the private sector
has fallen below 8%, its lowest level in 100 years; why strikes are an endangered
species; and why

workers are presumed to be employed “at will” and subject to

dismissal without notice or recourse.

Or perhaps there are other explanations for

labour’s failures in the United States.
One way to evaluate the lessons of the American experience is to look at some
international comparisons. A number of European countries have entrenched labour
rights in their constitutions. And, sure enough, workers in those countries do seem to
enjoy higher living standards,

greater job security

and more influence over their

working lives than do American workers. But does this prove that constitutionalization
produces better outcomes for workers?

Or merely that countries where

there is

widespread political and social support for decent treatment of workers are more likely
than others to constitutionalize arrangements designed to produce those outcomes?
This much, however, is clear: in few, if any, European countries is U.S.-style rightsbased constitutional litigation used to effect fundamental changes in workers’
protections or in labour market policies.

Canada provides another instructive comparison. Over the past decade or so, our
appellate courts have held that under the Charter workers have the right to associate
in unions, to call on their employers to bargain in good faith with that union, to picket
and (perhaps) strike to advance their interests, and to be protected against legislative
attempts to restrict those rights or to override collectively bargained agreements. The
courts have also ruled that the industrial torts and the common law of wrongful
dismissal must be reconfigured to accord with Charter principles. Is this not proofpositive that constitutionalization of workers’ rights will revive labour’s flagging
fortunes?

Time will tell. But here is what time has told us so far: Our second labour trilogy —
Dummore, Advance Cutting and Pepsi Cola, all favouring unions — was decided in
2001 and 2002. From then until 2008 — the latest figures available — union density
fell by 1.5 – 2.0%. That’s about the same rate of decline as it has experienced over
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the past thirty years. Let’s update those figures. Over the past two or three years
labour has won several more Charter victories — notably BC Health Services and
Fraser . However, from everything we know, union density has not miraculously
improved nor has union bargaining power taken a sudden spurt upwards. And let’s
look down the road twenty years: we can be pretty sure that union membership,
power and influence will have declined not grown; that Canadian workers will enjoy the
same wages or lower; that their jobs will be if anything more, not less, precarious; and
that the social safety net that protects them against the vicissitudes of the labour market
will have even more holes in it.

If the experience of the recent past and present means anything, and if my prediction
of the future is right, it seems clear that the Charter has failed, and will continue to fail,
to protect labour’s rights and interests in the real world. This is hardly surprising. As I
tried to demonstrate in an article I published a few years ago, all available evidence
suggests that we have vastly over-estimated the Charter’s potential to bring about
social transformation.

A moment’s reflection on the American experience would have

told us the same thing. Here’s a country whose constitution has protected the
fundamental rights of its citizens for the past 220 years; that has a hyper-developed
rights jurisprudence; that has some of the world’s most sophisticated constitutional
lawyers, scholars and judges and a citizenry that is more rights-conscious than any
other. But it’s also a country whose citizens suffer from greater racial and economic
inequality than anywhere else in the developed world; whose criminal justice system is
more punitive and dysfunctional; whose democratic institutions are in gridlock; whose
Supreme Court has just awarded ownership of its political process to corporations and
lobbyists; and not coincidentally, a country whose working people and labour unions
have been gradually but inexorably stripped of their rights and protections.

How can this be? Rights-based constitutional litigation ought in principle to be the
best safeguard for workers’ rights. Alas, in practice litigation is unlikely to alter the
deep structures of society and economy that relegate workers to a subordinate role in
their relations with employers.

There are many reasons why this is so.
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Some of these have to do with the way constitutions are framed and interpreted:
•

constitutions typically limit abuses perpetrated by state actors — not private or
corporate actors;

•

labour rights are necessarily couched in general language that can easily be
read down;

•

judges’ understanding of labour issues is often outdated: how else to explain
why the Supreme Court of Canada has embraced collective bargaining over the
past decade, just when everyone else has given it up for dead?

Some have to do with the whole notion of a litigation strategy:
•

litigation is expensive, slow and often inaccessible to individual workers or
their representatives;

•

evidentiary and procedural rules generally make adjudication unsuitable for the
resolution of open-ended conflicts of social interests;

•

remedies that might fundamentally transform labour’s situation would require a
redistribution of wealth and power that courts lack the capacity to design, a
mandate to initiate or the means to implement;

And some explanations have to do with the paradoxical quality of labour’s encounters
with law:
•

by pursuing their recourse within the existing constitutional framework, workers
would be implicitly agreeing to abstain from using their economic and political
power in ways that would radically alter that framework — a Faustian bargain
they might well come to regret.

All of these considerations make me very doubtful that a rights-based litigation-driven
strategy will end up achieving much for workers or unions.
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III

ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF CONSTITUTIONALIZATION

However, as I suggested earlier, the rights-based litigation-driven model of
constitutionalization is not the only one available. Many states — in both the global
North and the global South — have dealt with labour rights in their constitutions, often
in language that is merely symbolic or evocative rather than tightly prescriptive. Some
of these constitutions specify that legislation should be enacted to regulate
employment relations, some that the state should strive to achieve just labour market
outcomes, and some that employers and workers should collaborate in the
management of enterprises. But oddly, while these states have “constitutionalized”
labour rights they seem to end up adopting very different laws and policies,
constructing very different labour market institutions and achieving very different
degrees of industrial peace, social justice and national prosperity. In fact, there
seems to be a total disjuncture between the constitutional model adopted to protect
labour rights, on the one hand, and actual workplace and labour market outcomes on
the other. I conclude therefore that outcomes are almost wholly attributable to nonconstitutional factors: to national demographies and endowments, to national
histories and cultures, and above all, to the forces of national and international political
economy.

Nor is this counter-intuitive to anyone except lawyers.

Now let me return to the Canadian case. The Charter is not the only aspect of our
constitution that shapes labour law. Federalism does as well. In assigning jurisdiction
over labour matters to the provinces rather than to the federal government, the courts
relied on constitutional language that gave the provinces the right to legislate
concerning “matters of a merely local and private nature” and those involving “civil [that
is, contractual] rights”. This characterization of labour matters had important practical
effects: it forestalled the emergence of national labour standards and labour market
institutions; it prevented the federal government from implementing international
labour standards without provincial consent; it helped to dissolve the national labour
movement into often weak and sometimes warring provincial movements; it hampered
attempts to launch a national social democratic party; and it invited regulatory
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competition amongst the provinces, an invitation the Harris government in Ontario
(amongst others) accepted with alacrity. But most importantly, it constitutionalized
contractualism as the fundamental principle of labour law. In other words, federalism
rests on what I might call our political constitution – an array of beliefs about the nature
of our society and how it ought to be reflected in the organization of the state.
Here’s what I mean: the old Snider view was that labour issues were matters for the
parties to resolve contractually; the new BC Health Services view is that they are
unusually sensitive matters engaging important public policies and warranting legislative
attention that meets the highest democratic standards. The old Labour Conventions
view was that they are matters that have no inherent national or international dimension;
the new BC Health Services view is that Canadian workers are entitled to the same
protections that the international community requires states to extend to all their
citizens. This is not simply a change in thinking about the distribution of powers in our
federation; it is something much more important: a fundamental revision of the political
rationale underlying labour market regulation.

Indeed, I will go farther. The Charter itself, by protecting mobility rights, seems to
acknowledge and reinforce the existence of a national labour market. It seems
axiomatic, to me at least, that if there’s a national labour market, there should be
national labour market regulation. This is the principle that underlies CPP and EI and
federal-provincial cost-sharing arrangements for social services and health care; a
principle that persuaded the provinces to cobble together a Canada-wide regime of
pension regulation; and a principle that will become more explicit, pronounced and
legitimate if the Supreme Court endorses the proposed national securities regulator.
If I’m right, if there is indeed a shift in the locus of labour market regulation, it will highly
consequential for labour law and for the power of the labour movement. Such a shift –
to recapitulate - would result from a fundamental revision of the way we characterize
“labour”. It would then have to be understood a cause, not a result, of the Supreme
Court’s change of heart over the past decade.

However, things aren’t quite that simple. Like the rest of our economy, Canadian
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labour markets and labour market regulation are in the process of becoming not merely
national but continental. Given the powerful influence in Canada of American public
policies, political culture, legal concepts, financial capital and business ideology, a
new preamble has been surreptitiously written into the Constitution Act 1867. Canada
now has an economic constitution similar in principle to that of the United States. This
recital does not necessarily imply slavish imitation, nor does it necessarily have juridical
consequences, any more than did the old recital about having a political constitution
similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom. But make no mistake: under
American tutelage, we have accepted neo-liberalism as the default policy of our
political economy.

This means that we will normally adhere to monetarist policies that enable governments
to cool out labour markets by raising interest rates; that we will normally be taxationaverse, thus making the welfare state unaffordable; that we will normally regulate labour
markets as lightly as possible and dis-empower the agencies and tribunals we once
trusted to protect workers’ rights; and that we will normally privilege business interests
over those of other stakeholders. It also means that American and Canadian workers
are now, more than ever, in competition for jobs both with each other and with workers
offshore; that the trend to declining wages and benefits will prevail on both sides of the
border; that strategies designed to ensure “union-free” workplaces will be peddled
freely and pursued enthusiastically by both American and Canadian employers; and that
HR policies designed to achieve flexibilization of the workforce will remain the universal
response to global competition.

I have discussed rights–based constitutionalism and what I have described as political
and economic constitutionalism. Next, I want to say a word about a different kind of
constitution that I will describe as the “constitution of the enterprise”. A good deal of
research and debate in recent years has focussed on how workers are integrated (or
not integrated) into the governance of the enterprise. Here I’ll make special reference
to North American experience which admittedly lags far behind the experience of many
European countries whose actual experience, in turn, lags far behind the ideal-type of
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worker participation that is supposed to prevail in those countries.

In North America, we have undertaken four experiments in enterprise governance,
each of which was ostensibly designed to protect workers’ interests:
•

the collective bargaining model which attempted to endow “citizens at work” with
formal rights of association, voice and due process analogous to those they
enjoy in the broader society;

•

the “stakeholder” model which mandated management decision-makers to
address the best interests not only of shareholders but also of workers,
customers, suppliers and other stakeholders forseeably affected by corporate
action;

•

the “human capital” model whose rationale of enlightened self-interest was
meant to persuade employers to treat workers as valuable assets worthy of
investment in the form of good working conditions, benefits, amenities, training
and, especially, trust; and

•

the “worker capitalist” model which reminded workers that their pension and
other benefit funds made them significant members of the shareholding class,
with a stake in the success of predatory capitalism.

As things turned out, all four of these North American experiments in
“constitutionalizing” labour’s role in workplace governance failed. They did so in part
because they sought to reform workplace governance without taking into account the
aggressive form of liberal market capitalism that prevails in North America, and in part
because they neither acknowledged nor addressed the internal political economy of
the enterprise itself.

The constitution of the enterprise, it turns out, cannot be reformed

in isolation from the juridical, political and economic constitutions of the state. Or in
another formulation: varieties of capitalism give rise to varieties of workplace
constitutions, not vice versa.
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IV

CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE GLOBAL WORKPLACE

Capitalism, as we all know, operates not only within but across national borders. Deep,
institutionalized regional economic integration has been achieved in Europe; North
America has gone some distance down that path; and regional trade regimes have
begun to emerge in Latin America, Asia and Africa. The question is: will it be possible
to entrench labour rights in whatever passes for the constitutions of these regional
regimes?

Based on the European experience, one should not be too optimistic. Even the EU,
which leads the world in this respect, has been oddly diffident about entrenching
collective labour rights in its “constitution”, though the Lisbon Charter seems to have
moved the goalposts somewhat. NAFTA has been even more diffident, though the
NAALC does begin to construct a rickety institutional structure for the protection of
labour rights. But so far as I know, none of the other regional trade regimes has come
close to entrenching labour rights, except perhaps in a symbolic sense. What about
the WTO with its global mandate? That organization has a well developed dispute
resolution process, and could in principle require that its members comply with labour
rights a condition of participation in in the world economy. But it has resolutely refused
to adopt such a requirement.

That leaves the International Labour Organization as the leading candidate for the
protection of labour standards in the global economy. The ILO has promulgated almost
200 conventions defining the rights of workers; states that ratify these conventions are
obliged, under the ILO charter, to implement them. Moreover, the ILO has identified a
core of labour rights whose implementation is required of all member states even
without ratification, simply by virtue of their membership in that organization.

And

finally, ILO conventions have clearly influenced national laws and constitutions by
osmosis as well as by explicit adoption. But does all of this confer constitutional status
on the ILO’s 200 conventions or make them the fundamental norms of governance in
workplaces across the global economy?

By no means.
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Clearly, the entrenchment of fundamental labour rights in global workplaces presents
great challenges. The very nature of global corporations makes them relatively
impervious to transnational regulation. Global workplaces often form part of a
transnational value chain linking corporations with widely-dispersed partner firms,
subsidiaries and arm’s-length suppliers. It is therefore often difficult for workers to
identify their ultimate employer.

Second, given that their operations can be moved

relatively freely to different sites along the value chain, or off-loaded entirely, global
employers are easily able to escape both legal constraints imposed by national
governments and pressures generated by transnational unions or social movements.
Third, even if ILO norms were somehow “constitutionalized”, somehow embedded in
national constitutions, would workers be able to take advantage of them? Their ability
to do so is radically constrained because they are located in different countries, speak
different languages, are regulated by different national laws, have different (or no)
traditions of concerted action, experience different material circumstances and social
environments and may not even realize that they share a common employer.

These are all formidable practical barriers to constitutionalizing employment relations
in global enterprises. And let me add one more: the workers most in need of
protection are often located in the countries of the global south, where labour standards
are likely to be lower than in the global north. However, attempts to project labour
standards from north to south are almost certain to be regarded as a threat to the
comparative advantage of developing countries and as the manifestation of neocolonialism.

So: the constitutionalization of labour rights in the global context is almost unthinkable
for practical and political reasons.

And for conceptual and institutional reasons as

well. There is, as yet, no global constitution, legislature, executive or judiciary, no
global labour legislation, no global labour inspectorate or global labour movement.
These are all obvious impediments to the constitutionalization of labour rights on a
global scale. However, to be fair, some evidence suggests that labour rights are taking
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hold in places where they never existed before. Under attack from unions, social
movements and political opponents, governments of the home countries of global
corporations sometimes try to persuade or pressure those corporations to behave
decently when they operate abroad. To some extent as well, acceptable labour
standards become embedded in corporate policies, practices and routines of work that
are disseminated outward from the head office to all the elements of the global
enterprise. And finally, to some extent, ideas about labour rights — like ideas about
sport, style and sex — seem just to percolate across borders, at both the grassroots
and the elite level; through the media and by word of mouth; and with both positive and
negative consequences.

I mention these promising developments in order to suggest that sometimes
constitutions are created from the bottom up rather than the top down, that they may
result from an accidental concatenation of unrelated events rather that from the
deliberations of august assemblies, that they may be shaped by practical struggles in
particular domains rather than by the comprehensive designs of legal architects. That
certainly was the historic trajectory of the British constitution; and perhaps it will be the
trajectory of global constitutionalism as well.

V

CONCLUSION

I have framed this last observation as a commentary on the constitutionalization of
labour rights in the global economy.

But now, in conclusion, I will suggest that it

applies as well to domestic constitutions.

Clearly states can adopt juridical

constitutions; they can entrench labour rights; they can make those rights justiciable;
they can authorize citizens to sue to defend their rights; and they can authorize the
courts to award them remedies. In fact, this sort of constitutionalization proceeds at a
manic pace: since 1789 national constitutions have had a median life span of 17
years, and an average life span of less than half that.
constitutionalization signify?

But what does this sort of

Do we really imagine that each new constitution brings

fundamental change to the state that adopts it? that rights made justiciable thereby
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become effective in the real world? that citizens and workers endowed with those
rights will actually be empowered? that courts that acquire remedial powers can and
will attempt to use them to realign the deep structures of economy and polity? and
that if they do so, they will succeed in transforming global capitalism and making the
world better for workers?

I have asked a series of questions that are, in fact, variations on a single theme:
scepticism about rights-based, litigation-driven juridical models of constitutionalism. But
even though I’m a law professor, I know that I can’t end these remarks with questions
nor will scepticism earn me a graceful exit in this gathering of practical lawyers. I
therefore conclude by offering four hypotheses about the future of labour law that are,
in my view, entirely plausible:
•

the constitution that counts is the “real” constitution that expresses, normalizes,
legitimates and therefore reinforces actual-existing relations of power: this is the
political and economic constitution, not the juridical constitution what entrenches
rights and grounds litigation;

•

in the event of conflict, this “real” political and economic constitution will prevail
over juridical constitutions;

•

strategies designed to produce significant change though constitutional litigation
will therefore prove in the long run to be disappointing for labour; but

•

(my final hypothesis) workers make constitutions, not the other way ‘round; the
history of labour law clearly demonstrates that workers with an inclination and
capacity for collective action will find a way to vindicate their “rights” and protect
their interests, whatever the constitution might say, however the courts might
rule and whatever lawyers and law professors might tell them.

